Abstract-The work described here concerns the use of so-called multilegged arguments to support dependability claims about software-based systems. The informal justification for the use of multilegged arguments is similar to that used to support the use of multiversion software in pursuit of high reliability or safety. Just as a diverse 1-out-of-2 system might be expected to be more reliable than each of its two component versions, so might a two-legged argument be expected to give greater confidence in the correctness of a dependability claim (for example, a safety claim) than would either of the argument legs alone. Our intention here is to treat these argument structures formally, in particular, by presenting a formal probabilistic treatment of "confidence," which will be used as a measure of efficacy. This will enable claims for the efficacy of the multilegged approach to be made quantitatively, answering questions such as, "How much extra confidence about a system's safety will I have if I add a verification argument leg to an argument leg based upon statistical testing?" For this initial study, we concentrate on a simplified and idealized example of a safety system in which interest centers upon a claim about the probability of failure on demand. Our approach is to build a "Bayesian Belief Network" (BBN) model of a two-legged argument and manipulate this analytically via parameters that define its node probability tables. The aim here is to obtain greater insight than what is afforded by the more usual BBN treatment, which involves merely numerical manipulation. We show that the addition of a diverse second argument leg can indeed increase confidence in a dependability claim; in a reasonably plausible example, the doubt in the claim is reduced to one-third of the doubt present in the original single leg. However, we also show that there can be some unexpected and counterintuitive subtleties here; for example, an entirely supportive second leg can sometimes undermine an original argument, resulting, overall, in less confidence than what came from this original argument. Our results are neutral on the issue of whether such difficulties will arise in real life-that is, when real experts judge real systems.
INTRODUCTION
A SSESSMENT of the dependability of software-based systems has long been acknowledged to be difficult. There are several reasons for this. Software is often novel, so claims can rarely be based upon previous experience. Much of the evidence available concerns the software process -how it was built-and not the built product itself. There is a great reliance upon expert judgment-for example, in how claims about the quality of the build process can be turned into claims about the delivered product's dependability. There may be doubt about the truth of some of the assumptions that underpin the reasoning used to support a claim, for example, that a test oracle is correct.
Such uncertainty about dependability claims is particularly important when the systems involved are safety critical. One approach that has been proposed to try to limit and control this uncertainty is the use of multiple diverse arguments to support dependability claims: The idea is analogous to the use of fault tolerance to make systems reliable. Thus, each of the diverse arguments could, in principle, support the claim but might be undermined by doubt about underlying assumptions, weakness of evidence, and so forth.
In recent years, some standards and codes of practice have suggested the use of diverse arguments. In UK Defence Standard 00-55 [1] , for example, it was suggested that one leg be based upon logical proof of correctness and the other upon statistical testing. Argument legs are sometimes quite asymmetric: For example, in [2] , the first leg is potentially complex, whereas the second leg is deliberately simple. Occasionally, the only difference between the legs lies in the people involved, as, for example, in independent verification and validation. This last case can be plausible when there is a paucity of hard empirical evidence upon which to base the arguments, and thus, necessarily, a large element of expert judgment is used-different teams might provide some protection against identical human mistakes.
The differences shown in these examples reflect, we believe, the need for better understanding about the use of diversity in arguments. At an informal level, diversity seems plausibly to be "a good thing," just as it is for achieving system dependability, but there is no theoretical underpinning to such an assertion. For example, we do not know what the "best" ways to use diversity are (or even exactly what "best" means here); we do not know how much we can claim for the use of diversity in a particular case.
Our aim in this paper is to provide the beginnings of a formalism to answer some of these questions and provide support for the "diversity approach." We shall look at the combination of multiple argument legs in a part of a safety case for a critical system. The difficult questions here concern how to combine the disparate evidence and assumptions that form the different legs. There are several such questions that might be of interest. For example, we might want to know whether multilegged arguments are efficient in the sense of being cost-effective; for example, for a given outlay, would it be better to divide this between a proof and a testing leg or to spend it all on a larger test?
On an informal level, one can take an argument leg to comprise some assumptions, some evidence, and some reasoning that allow a dependability claim to be made at a certain level of confidence. Typically, such an argument leg will support an infinite number of different (claim, confidence) pairs-the more stringent the claim, the lower the confidence that will come from a particular argument leg. We shall interpret "confidence" to be a probability (that the claim is true). This probability, in turn, will be interpreted as the usual Bayesian subjective strength of belief in the claim, held by an individual whom we shall refer to as "the expert." This person might be a regulator or some other person who has to make a decision on the acceptability of the system.
It is, thus, confidence that allows us to discuss the "strength" of arguments; for example, an argument that allows someone to place 99 percent confidence in a claim that a system's probability of failure on demand is less than 10 À3 is clearly "stronger" than an argument that only allows them to place 90 percent confidence; in this paper, we shall always consider the claim to be fixed-perhaps arising from some wider safety case-and thus compare arguments solely via the confidence they engender in this claim. Clearly, this is not the only way one could proceed, but it will suffice for our purposes here.
It is easy to see that confidence-and its complement, "doubt"-will depend upon the confidence/doubt in the truth of the assumptions underpinning the argument, strength and/or extensiveness of the evidence, and correctness of the reasoning. Continuing in this informal vein, it seems plausible that, for multilegged arguments, the overall effectiveness will depend upon the same factors and, in addition, the dependence between the legs. Thus, we might expect a two-legged argument whose legs are "very diverse" to be more effective-that is, give greater confidence-than one where the legs are very similar (all things being equal).
Of course, as we have been at pains to state, all this is very informal. Our intention in the work reported here is to put these ideas onto a formal basis.
We shall use as the basis of the paper a more formal treatment of an example first examined in [3, Example 1, p. 27] . In this example, a two-legged argument was proposed. First, a leg based upon statistical evidence from operational testing and the use of an oracle produces a claim for a particular probability of failure upon demand (pfd). It is reasoned that this pfd represents a sufficiently small risk during the expected operational life of the system. To this part of the argument is added a second leg based instead on logical reasoning, which is assumed to produce a claim for complete perfection of operational behavior (at least with respect to a subclass of failures). Here, the second leg produces a claim of complete freedom from (a class of) faults. If the overall argument is intended to support a claim of (better than) 10 À3 pfd, then only the statistical testing leg addresses this directly. Nevertheless, it is easy to see how the logical leg can provide additional support: If the statistical evidence alone gives 99 percent confidence in 10 À3 , then the additional verification leg might allow this level of confidence in 10 À3 to be increased. Note that, for these individual legs, important sources of doubt in the claim are doubt about the correctness of the oracle (for the testing leg) and doubt about the correctness of the specification (for the verification leg). Furthermore, such doubts are likely to be dependent; in particular, doubt in the correctness of the specification is likely to affect doubt in the correctness of the oracle. We might expect that the greater the doubt in the specification, the greater the doubt in the oracle. Clearly, these doubts will propagate and affect the confidence associated with the use of both arguments in a two-legged configuration; we might expect this confidence to be less than what would be the case if the specification and oracle doubts were independent.
Note also that dependence between legs in this example can arise in other ways. It could arise from the evidence; for example, the observation of a failure in the testing leg would completely refute the perfection claim of the second leg.
Issues of (lack of) dependence here are very similar to those that arise in system diversity, where it is has been established from theoretical [4] , [5] and empirical [6] studies that independence is extremely elusive. If this is also true for arguments, we would need to be skeptical of simplistic claims, for example, that the 99 percent confidence in a claim could be justified from an arguement based on two legs, each of which alone only allows 90 percent confidence. Proper understanding of argument dependence, is therefore an important goal of this research. It turns out, in fact, that issues of dependence between legs can be subtle and counterintuitive.
We realize that much of what we say here applies to the dependability assessment of systems in general, but the issues discussed are often particularly acute for softwarebased systems, where there may be great complexity and novelty in the system design and there is typically a large reliance, during the safety assesment, on expert judgment.
In this paper, we mainly concentrate on the problems associated with the assessment of confidence. We only address issues of decision making-for example, whether to accept and deploy a system-briefly, and then only to treat the case of "dangerous" argument failure, that is, the acceptance of an untrue claim. The other kind of failurerejecting a claim when it is true-will also be important (for example, it may have important economic consequences) but will not be considered here. This paper is organized as follows: We begin by describing a six-variable Bayesian belief network (BBN) representing the structure of the two-legged argument example. A BBN topology for this system assessment is first presented, with an enumeration of the independency model 1 it represents.
There follow proposals for the content of those parts of the node probability tables that would be required in order to deal with the observation case that is of the greatest practical importance for the application. This is the "complete success" case, which we shall term the ideal observation case for this two-legged argument. For this, we suppose that the execution testing discovers no failures at all (testing leg success); furthermore, the system is formally verified correct against its specification (verification leg success). This case is of practical importance in some safety-critical industries, where it is the only case that would allow acceptance of a system for operational use. In the UK nuclear industry, for example, failures in testing would be unacceptable regardless of what could be inferred statistically from the test result.
Our allocation of node probability tables used to analyze this ideal observations case is parameterized; that is, it specifies the conditional probabilities of each node, given its parents' values, numerically except for unspecified values of a set of independent model parameters. There are 12 independent model parameters significant for the analysis of the ideal observation case. A particular expert's beliefs will thus be represented by an assignment of numerical values to these parameters.
A substantial part of the remainder of the paper examines the consequences of different expert beliefs, concentrating on questions of when the two-legged approach is effective and what are the factors that determine its effectiveness. We show that there are some unexpected subtleties here and give examples of some surprising and nonintuitive results.
MODEL VARIABLE DEFINITIONS AND BBN TOPOLOGY
The construction of our model proceeds in the usual stages of model variable identification, definition, and respective state-space construction; BBN topology construction to represent graphically assumed conditional independencies (CIs) among the model variables; and, finally, local node conditional probability table definition. In this ordered presentation of the process, the discoveries and difficulties encountered during later stages may well feed back into adjustments and refinements to earlier stages. The first stage in building a BBN is the identification of model variables. Our model variables are defined in the following list, which gives in square brackets the state-space we have used, in this paper, for each variable. For the sake of simplicity, in this initial model formulation, the statespaces are all Boolean, apart from the first. In some cases, this is a deliberate simplification of the real situation, which we do not intend to retain in all our future work:
. S. The system's unknown, true probability of failure on demand (pfd) ½0 S 1. . Z. The system specification ½Z 2 fcorrect; incorrectg.
A system verification is performed directly against this specification to form one leg of the system dependability argument. . V . The conclusion from the verification of the system against its specification ½V 2 fverified; not verifiedg. For the purposes of the current investigation, we shall be interested only in the ideal observation outcome that the system is verified as correct. . O. The oracle used in system testing (by execution of the system) ½O 2 fcorrect; incorrectg. In this current BBN, we have, for simplicity, made the unrealistic assumption that the operational profile used to simulate the test inputs is perfectly representative of the statistical pattern occurring during real use. . T . The system test results ½T 2 fno failures; failuresg.
We shall be interested here only in the ideal observation case of no failures. . C. The acceptance (or otherwise) of final claim as to whether or not the system is fit for use ½C 2 faccepted; rejectedg. Of course, C's two parents, T and V , are both observable nodes. Therefore, in one usage scenario we have in mind for this model, C will be a "deterministic" node, in the sense that its realized value will be a chosen deterministic function of its parents' values. For the purposes of illustration throughout this paper, we will use the claim that the operational system pfd S is better than 10 À3 . The ultimate purpose of the following BBN model is to derive posterior distributions of random variables S and C of practical importance (goal variables), following the observation of other variables T and V whose values are directly measurable (or amenable to direct human assessment). The model, like most other BBN models, also includes essential model-structural "mediating variables" Z and O, in this case, which fall into neither of these two categories. Formally, the BBN topology encodes a system of CI assumptions, collectively termed a Markov model, (in)-dependency relation, (in)dependency model, or CI relation-see [7, p. 91] , [8, Section 2.4] , and [9, p. 5]-which enable the grand multivariate distribution of all model variables to be composed of several node conditional probability distributions of lower dimension. Consequently, the required posterior distributions of goal variables given evidence can likewise be expressed, in Section 3, in terms of these node conditional distributions. The CI assumptions encoded in the topology justify the derivations involved, and the pictorial representation of this topology, properly understood, efficiently communicates these CI assumptions (some more evidently than others). Thus, probabilistic CI assumptions and the BBN topologies that encode them are devices for constructing, communicating, and reasoning with multivariate probability models.
The theoretical study of how a probabilistic CI model may be precisely represented by a graph is based on an analogy of probabilistic CI relations with various notions of the separation of two sets of graph nodes by a third "separator" set of nodes. The formal notions of "d-separation," "graphoid," "semigraphoid," and "I-map" are central to this theory. See [7] , [8] , [9] , [10] for further details.
Our BBN topology is shown in Fig. 1 . Expressed algebraically, the "CI statement" (or just "CI" for short), "A is conditionally independent of B, given S," can be thought of as a factorization property of the joint distribution function:
A ?
? BjS means P ðA; B; SÞ ¼ P ðAjSÞP ðBjSÞP ðSÞ; ð1Þ
where A, B, and S here represent sets of model random variables. 2 Thus, each CI assumption asserts that joint (or "joint conditional") probability distributions will factorize -in precisely stated ways-into products of other conditional 2. Other forms such as P ðA; BjSÞ ¼ P ðAjSÞP ðBjSÞ are for most practical purposes equivalent, although there may be occasional exceptions relating to conditioning on zero-probability S-events. Some authors use the very inclusive definition, avoiding potential zero divisions, P ðA; B; SÞP ðSÞ ¼ P ðA; SÞP ðB; SÞ. joint distributions, each involving fewer variables. 3 Our Markov model was constructed in the BBN form in Fig. 1 by explicitly making the CI assumptions that each graph node is conditionally independent, given its parents, of its other nondescendants. Other CI statements are logical consequences of these. (See, for example, [7] , [11] for precise definitions and theory of how to use the net topology to determine all its logical CI consequences.) The term conditional dependence denotes simply the absence of a specified CI factorization.
The graph topology of our BBN can be thought of as an embodiment of a Markov model, that is, a complete and consistent 4 set of CI beliefs of an expert concerning the model random variables. There are many ways of specifying the dependency model, which this graph topology represents. For example, one economical and logically independent set of CI assumptions that together completely specify the model is
Expressed in terms of its 26 elementary CI statements 5 as in [8] , the same dependency model can be written
When an expert declares himself satisfied with a BBN topology such as that in Fig. 1 , he is really saying that he believes the CI assertions that are entailed by the topology. Thus, part of the topology elicitation exercise would be an exposure to and acceptance of these.
The idea captured by the ternary relation A ? ? BjS can be expressed less formally by the statement "Observation of S renders A irrelevant to B" [7] . A probabilistic uncertainty model implies an A $ B-symmetry of this statement. Care is required with its interpretation; the term "observation" denotes complete observation in the sense that the values of all variables in S should be made exactly known before a person interested (solely) in the values of B will lose interest in the information about variables A. See [7] , [11] , [12] , [13] , [14] , [15] , [16] , and [9, Section 1.2.1]. For example, our model assumes V ?
? T jSZ. A factorization such as
does not follow, whereas
is logically entailed within our model. This particular CI assumption also illustrates another important point about the above informal interpretation of CI assumptions. In practice, we may still incorporate in our model such a CI assumption, even though we may not expect to observe variable(s) S, or where S may be, in principle, impossible to observe. Then, it is the hypothetical exact knowledge of S that is the conceptual device used to interpret the above CI assumption. In practical model building, many CI assumptions may be of this form in which the precise values of conditioning variables of some CI assumptions are never expected to be known, as with the assumption V ?
? T jSZ in our model. To state one last clarification about the interpretation of the CI assumption A ?
? BjS, note that the conditioning knowledge state, assumed to produce the irrelevance of A to B, consists of knowing only the exact value of S. The irrelevance can later be destroyed by subsequently acquired knowledge, exact or approximate, of other variables. Therefore, strictly, assumption A ?
? BjS says that, when S is exactly known, A is irrelevant to B for only just so long as the state of all other model variables remains completely unknown, that is, while we do not discover anything else than the value of S.
Figs. 2 and 3 show the BBNs representing an obvious pair of single-legged arguments whose "combination," in some sense, we have discussed up to now, in the form of the BBN model shown in Fig. 1 .
These topologies may be obtained from that in Fig. 1 by removing one or the other of the two observable nodes V and T . It may be that an expert who accepts the dependency model in Fig. 1 as correct for the uncertainties inherent in the two-legged argument would feel the same about Fig. 2 or 3 for an argument in which only one of these two sources of evidence is available. More rigorously, the relationship between these one-legged and two-legged argument topologies is not trivial. We do not envisage that the appropriate one-legged dependency model should necessarily be merely a "marginal" of the two-legged model, obtained by summation over the observable V or T that is to be removed. For example, in all the example uses of these 3 . Conditional independence means distinct factors may contain common variables.
4. No set of CI assertions can in itself exhibit logical inconsistency. The associated Markov model includes all the logical CI consequences of the explicitly asserted CI statements. We need all of these to be consistent with any conditional dependence beliefs expressed by the same expert.
5. Volf and Studen y [8] show that every probabilistic dependency model is completely characterized by listing its elementary CI statements. topologies which follow, we choose to assign the values of C, "claim acceptance," deterministically in terms of C's (one or two) parents' values. This means that our single-legged models will attribute to variable C a different stochastic relationship with the remaining model variables. (Below, in our model based on the topology of Fig. 2 , we make C a deterministic function of T alone; in our two-legged model based on Fig. 1 , we do not.) In what follows, when we have assigned node conditional probabilities to our topologies, we will say a little more about the relationship between the three multivariate probability models that result.
Represented algebraically, the two single-leg dependency models are
Testing Leg
Verification Leg
? OSZ j T the first OS-symmetric and the second SZ-symmetric. 6 In the form of exhaustive lists of elementary CIs, we have
Readers may have noticed that, although we have informally treated a two-legged argument as a combination of single legs, our more formal treatment above has moved in the reverse direction. Comparison of these last CI lists with the one mentioned earlier in this section clearly does not indicate any formal operation allowing composition of these two single-legged dependency models to create the two-legged model. The two-legged model in Fig. 1 is a construction embodying various subjective beliefs about the dependencies arising in practice among the variables of our particular application. In particular, our two-legged dependency model can be characterized neither as weaker nor as stronger than the simple conjunction 7 of the two separate single-legged dependency models.
Precisely, using the elementary CI statement dependency model characterization, the two-legged model deletes all CIs from one single-legged model, most CIs from the other, and, of course, introduces several other CIs whose contexts 8 are not contained in the variable set for either single leg.
Deleted from Deleted from Appended
Testing Leg Verification Leg
Clearly, many of these changes involve variable C and relate to its changed role, mentioned above, in the dependence structure as we move between these three dependency models.
COMPUTATIONS FROM THESE BBN TOPOLOGIES
We are primarily interested in the updated joint probability distribution P ðCS j observationsÞ, particularly, the value P ðC ¼ accepted; S > 10 À3 j observationsÞ concerning 6 . The latter symmetry is not inherited in Fig. 3 itself, though there are derivable canonical graph representations which always show the same symmetries as the dependency model they represent such as the "largest chain graph" [8] , [17] model representation.
7. That is, the pooled set of conditional independencies that involves the six variables.
8. The context of a CI statement is the set of all the model variables it involves: contextðA ?
? an unsafe failure of the entire two-legged assessment activity. Starting from this BBN model, the observations available will typically consist of values for the pair V , T of model variables. Under the CI assumptions comprising this dependency model, the joint distribution of these four variables has a representation:
For any pair of observed values ðV ; T Þ, we obtain the desired updated distribution for ðC; SÞ by normalizing
We have used integration over our single continuous model variable S here, interpreting P ðSjZÞ as a density function. In fact, notice that, since we are to accept that perfection ðS ¼ 0Þ is possible, then we must allow mixed distributions for S (these often involving other model variables too, being joint or conditional distributions). In this notation, this means thinking of integrands over S as potentially exhibiting "delta-function-like" behavior at S ¼ 0. (One could use the Lebesgue-Stieltjes integrals [18] to notate this more rigorously.)
NODE PROBABILITY ASSUMPTIONS

Simplifying and Conservative Assumptions
We start with some assumptions that will simplify the mathematics. Some of these assumptions are quite strong. In Section 4.2, we consider some specific parametric refinements of some of these starting assumptions:
. Determinism of claim acceptance. An assumption for our ideal observations case of success on both argument legs, ðV ; T Þ ¼ ðverified; no failuresÞ, which simplifies the above considerably, is the conditional probability table entry:
That is to say, the value of the claim C is fully determined by these observed values of ðV ; T Þ alone, so that
For this observed ðV ; T Þ, (2) and (3) then both become zero for C ¼ rejec ted, whereas, for C ¼ accepted, (2) loses the term to the left of the braces, as does the numerator in (3). Thus, substituting into (3) leaves us with the expression P À ðC; SÞ ¼ ðaccepted; sÞ ideal obs: 
for the updated probability density of S, given the ideal observations (for both argument legs). Here, the condition "j ideal obs:" is shorthand for "jðV; T Þ ¼ ðverified; no failuresÞ." Keep in mind that we can interpret the numerator and denominator of the conditional probability (5) as, respectively, an unconditional probability density and an unconditional probability in the usual way (see, for example, (13)).
It is the behavior of this formula (5) for the distribution of the pfd S conditionally given the ideal observations that forms the focus of the remainder of the paper. . Verification fallibility against correct specification.
Against a correct specification, an infallible verification procedure would pass the system precisely if its true pfd is zero: Provided the specification is correct, any positive pfd, however small, will always have been caused by a fault, which will certainly show up as a failure to verify the system. Conversely, one might assume that all systems that fail the verification have nonzero true pfds. Instead, we introduce a pair of verification fallibility parameters , allowing the breakdown of both of these ideal behaviors of the verification process:
Thus, our model allows that, against a correct specification, -perfectly reliable system can fail 9 the verification, with probability , and -a system having a positive pfd can pass the verification, with probability . For simplicity, we assume that the probability (that is, conditionally given hS ¼ s; Z ¼ correcti) of the latter kind of verification failure is independent of the actual (positive) value s of variable S. (Of course, this constraint could be relaxed in future models, perhaps, by using a parametric function ðsÞ.) Note that the special case ð; Þ ¼ ð0; 0Þ restores the infallibility assumption for the verification process (provided that the specification is correct), as outlined above. . Conservative assumption for incorrect specification. Against an incorrect specification, we make the 9 . We have to be careful about terminology here: Surely, there may be systems that contain "faults" while being perfectly reliable. (For example, defective functionality may not be exercised by a particular operational profile or the system may contain internal fault tolerance, which eliminates the possibility that a certain "fault" could ever result in a system failure.) conservative (that is, pessimistic, taking the perspective of the overriding undesirability of accepting a bad system) assumption that any system will always pass a verification against this specification:
. Geometric time-to-failure distribution during testing. We assume that n test inputs cause failures independently with the operational pfd S, which are detected with certainty (and with no false alarms) if the oracle is correct. Therefore, the probability table of variable T has
. Conservative assumption for incorrect oracle. To address the case of an incorrect oracle, we again adopt a conservative assumption, similar to that used above for the case of verification against an incorrect specification:
. Stochastic ordering constraint. We propose, for the conditional distribution of S given Z, a requirement for the following kind of stochastic ordering as a function of Z:
where it is allowed that either or both of these distributions can have mass concentrated at s ¼ 0, subject to this inequality.
Distributional Assumptions
We begin by introducing some shorter notation for those probabilities which will not now be substituted by a parametric distribution: We will use the symbol for the unconditional joint distribution of variables ZO, taken in that order, with a first index to represent the Z value and a second index to represent O. That is, we name four unconditional probabilities, cc þ ci þ ic þ ii ¼ 1, with c for correct and i for incorrect. We also use a "wild card notation," Ã, for the marginal distributions of Z and of O, so, for example,
Later, we will sometimes display these prior probabilities of variables ZO using a 2 Â 2 matrix layout:
This matrix represents an important set of prior beliefs, since it is here that the dependence between our doubts about specification and oracle correctness is captured. There is likely to be positive "assumption dependence" here, which will presumably cause dependence between the argument legs and undermine, to some extent, the efficacy of the two-legged approach.
For the conditional distribution P ðS j ZÞ, we have the complication that it may be a mixed distribution. In our parametric examples, we assume this to be continuous on S 2 ½0; 1 except for a possible concentrated mass at S ¼ 0. Denote the two concentrated masses p 0jc and p 0ji , where the c or i indicates the conditioning value of Z. (We will require p 0jc > p 0ji in compliance with assumption (10).) For the sake of statistical conjugacy [19, chapter 9] with the discrete time model (8), we will use a beta distribution for the continuous component. Therefore, for 0 < s 1, use
for some a, b, a 0 , and b 0 > 0. Note that if ¼ 0, the latter of these two distributions is "masked out" by the zero value in assumption (6) from the distributions (3, 5, 13) so that parameters a 0 and b 0 disappear with from the "ideal observations" model in that case. (See columns 5 and 6 (of 8) in Table 1 .) In other cases, in which > 0, note that our assumption (10) translates into a messy but computable constraint on a, b, a 0 , b 0 , p 0ji , and p 0jc . (One may simply use analytic differentiation with respect to s and then numerical zero-finding of monotonic functions to determine the local minima of the difference between the right-hand side and the left-hand side of inequality (10) , which, with the limiting values at the two endpoints, s ! 0; 1, can be used to formulate the constraint that the inequality shall hold over the whole interval 0 s < 1.) Table Assumptions on (5) The above assumptions about the node probability tables can now be substituted in the numerator of (5). This numerator is, in fact, simply the prior probability density of "S and ideal observation on both argument legs." We will denote it as P ðS & ideal obs:Þ, meaning, more precisely P ðs & ideal obs:Þ ¼ P À ðC; S; V ; T Þ ¼ ðaccepted; s; verified; no failuresÞ Á :
Effect of Node Probability
ð13Þ Table 1 shows how the value of (13) is a sum of four terms corresponding to the different configurations of ZOdealing separately with the case S ¼ 0. The four terms summed are each a product of three entries in the top part of a vertical column of the table (in each single column, the three entries in the three rows immediately under the double line that separates the headers) weighted also by the prior probability of the value of the pair ZO, which selects the column. Without this P ðZOÞ weighting factor, the column product P ðV T S j ZOÞ ¼ P ðT j OSÞP ðS j ZÞP ðV j SZÞ is the probability (density, for S > 0) of seeing the ideal observations V T and of the pfd having a true (unknown) value S conditioned (as if these were known) on specified ZO values. Note that the case s > 0 becomes much simplified under the verification infallibility assumption ð; Þ ¼ ð0; 0Þ, with the two zero values in the third row of the body of the table causing some terms from subsequent rows to disappear; if we assume it is impossible to verify an imperfect system against a correct specification, then a part of the total probability (13) disappears. The second to last row of the table gives the value of (13) for S ¼ 0 on the left and for 0 < S 1 on the right. In the latter case, this probability is actually a density in its S-argument. We can think of the value "ideal obs." as the vector of observed values of CV T or, effectively, of just V T since we have assumed C to be determined by V T in this ideal case (4) .
For these ideal observations V T ¼ ðverified; no failuresÞ, the S ¼ 0 cases of the three equations (7), (8) , and (9) produce the six 10 1s that occur in the left half of Table 1 . These assumptions therefore mean that
That is, under our conservative assumptions and irrespective of assumed correctness or otherwise of the oracle, the conditional probability of seeing the ideal observations from a system known to be perfect becomes certainty if the specification is assumed incorrect and 1 À if the specification is assumed correct.
The last row of Table 1 gives the denominator of (5). This normalizer is just
Substituting the entries in Table 1 into (5) gives the conditional probability P S ¼ 0jideal obs: ð Þand also, for S > 0, the conditional probability density pdf S j ideal obs: ð Þ in each case as the ratio of expressions in the last two rows of the table. Care is necessary in the use of notation for discontinuities and points of concentrated mass: Note the comment under the table.
EXPRESSIONS FOR CONFIDENCE AND DOUBT
Substituting these further assumptions and abbreviated notations into the penultimate row in Table 1 (which originated from the numerator of (5)) gives the concentrated mass
10. Note how just three equations produce six 1s here, essentially because the topology says that T ?
? ZjOS and V ? ? OjZS. Therefore, reading across the first row, the conditional probabilities of T alternate in each half of the table, and, reading across the third row, the conditional probabilities of V occur in adjacent pairs. 
To obtain the conditional distribution of S given the ideal observations, we require a normalizer from the above joint probability density (and point mass) corresponding to the last row in Table 1 :
where the left-hand term is the point mass contribution, which is understood to be excluded from the domain of the right-hand integral term. Substituting from (14) and (15) yields
using notation for the nth noncentral moment of the beta distribution: 0 , and b 0 > 0, we always have and 0 strictly decreasing in n, both being 1 at n ¼ 0 and having , 0 ! 0 as n ! 1 (though the convergence can be slow for small a, a 0 ). From (15) and (17), we can express the doubt or probability of "unsafe failure" of the entire two-legged assessment procedure represented by these modeling assumptions, with the formula 
where I 1Às denotes the (regularized) incomplete beta function using the notation (18), with the strict inequality in the probability on the LHS, actually holds for all (non-negative) s, including s ¼ 0.
We shall refer to the conditional probability (18) in what follows as the "doubt function." This function of 13 independent arguments (the threshold s value and the 12 independent parameters of our node conditional probabilities) is an important consequence of our model as it stands, capturing the probability of the most important kind of "argument failure" we first identified in Section 1. There are several related measures that could be substituted here. To be exact, this one is the conditional probability that such an unsafe argument failure has occurred, given that a system is deemed accepted by the two-legged argument. Of course, this is distinct from the unconditional probability that a randomly selected system will be truly unsafe ðS > sÞ and will be (incorrectly) accepted by the two-legged argument as sufficiently safe (the numerator of (18)). It is also different from the probability that a randomly selected unsafe system will be deemed sufficiently safe by the twolegged argument. The conversions between these are straightforward, depending on quantities such as the "base rate" of truly unsafe systems among systems, which are submitted for evaluation by this procedure, and the rates at which rejections of randomly submitted systems will occur. Note that, in our model as presently formulated, these marginal background rates are not outside the scope of the model. They are implied by our chosen values for model parameters: in the first case (the marginal probability P ðS > 10 À3 Þ), by s, and p 0ji , a, b, p 0jc , a 0 , and b 0 and, in the latter case (the marginal probability P ðC ¼ rejectedÞ), by the entire set of 12 independent model parameters.
We note again the significant degree of simplification occurring in the case ¼ 0. In that case, not only do parameters a 0 and b 0 become irrelevant to the posterior probability distribution (18) of S given the ideal observations, but also (18) depends on only two of the three independent degrees of freedom of the prior ZO distribution . The conditional probability (18) , in this special ¼ 0 case of the ideal observations scenario, depends on the marginal probability P ðZÞ and on the conditional probability P ðOjZ ¼ incorrectÞ. Its lack of dependence on P ðOjZ ¼ correctÞ is explained by the fact that the infallibility assumption ¼ 0 for the verification process in the case ðS > 0; Z ¼ correctÞ, given by the top line of (6), creates two zeros in the fifth and sixth columns in Table 1 which, by multiplication, effectively "mask out" from the final rows in Table 1 (that is, from (2) and the numerator and denominator of (3) and (5)) the only case of dependence of any term in these equations on the state of variable O when Z ¼ correct (the pair of unequal entries in Table 1 located two rows above this pair of zeros). Conditionally, given the ideal observation Z ¼ correct, this masked-out ðS > 0; Z ¼ correctÞ scenario is the only means by which our posterior distribution of S could have otherwise (without the masking effect of putting ¼ 0 in assumption (6)) depended on the state of O. This is because the conservative assumption (9) removes any dependence on O from the LHS in Table 1 , where S ¼ 0. As soon as we relax either the verification infallibility, ¼ 0, or the conservative assumption (9), which interacts in this simplifying way here, we obtain the greater complexity of a conditional probability P ðS > s j ideal obs:Þ, which involves all 12 independent parameters of our parametric node probabilities.
If s is small, it may be numerically more accurate (depending, for example, on the precision properties of the incomplete beta algorithm at its extreme arguments) to compute, instead, the confidence using
To look briefly at some actual numbers, we will first consider an infallible verification assumption of the form ð; Þ ¼ ð0; 0Þ, which reduces the number of active model parameters significantly, from 12 to 7, for the reasons just explained. Under this simplifying assumption, all entries in the third row of Table 1 are zeros and ones. These eight entries in fact-given the CI assumptions of the model topology--may be taken in pairs, reading across, and actually represent only four CI table entries (because of the lack of dependence on variable O, the oracle correctness). The third, fourth, seventh, and eighth entries in this row of the table are justified as a single conservative assumption to cover the case of an incorrect system specification. Here, we have assumed pessimistically, with (7) , that the verification against such an incorrect yardstick will always produce a positive conclusion about any built system, irrespective of its actual failure probability S. We will retain this conservative assumption below. In contrast, for the other case-that the specification Z is correct-the remaining four entries of the same row are affected by two kinds of "infallibility" assumption, ¼ 0 and ¼ 0, for the verification activity. We cannot justify these from an argument for conservatism. The assumption ¼ 0 affecting the fifth and the sixth columns can even be viewed as overly optimistic, depending on how we define the correctness of a specification and how the verification is carried out in practice.
If where the incomplete beta term I 1Às ð999; 1Þ may be thought of as the corresponding probability P ðX > sÞ for a random variable X, which is beta distributed with parameters ða; bÞ ¼ ð1; 999Þ: The same applies to the other incomplete beta term but with parameters ða; bÞ ¼ ð1; 5;601Þ instead. The latter is a smaller beta probability-considerably smaller for many s-values; the respective means of these two beta distributions are 0.001 and 0.00018. Under our assumption ¼ 0, it makes no difference in (18) respectively, whereas the values of ð ic ; ii Þ between these two extremes lead to values intermediate between these two, producing a curve that is hyperbolic in form and monotonically increasing 13 as the 0.2 probability mass is steadily shifted from ic to ii . For instance, if we put s ¼ 10 À3 , these two endpoints of this increasing hyperbolic segment are P ðS > s j ideal obs:Þ ¼ 0:00022 at ic ¼ 0:2 and P ðS > s j ideal obs:Þ ¼ 0:098 at ii ¼ 0:2.
These numbers illustrate how the joint prior beliefs concerning the two unobservable variables ZO-incorporating the prior doubt about Z and O individually, as well as beliefs about the association between their likely values-can influence the doubt about the claim produced by the two-legged argument. Although the model we are using is very simplified at this stage, we expect that such prior beliefs represented at "the top part" of our BBN topology may well continue, under more sophisticated and realistic models, to be a driver for the amount of extra confidence gained when safety arguments are combined in this kind of formal way.
HOW EFFECTIVE IS THIS MULTILEGGED ARGUMENT APPROACH IN GAINING CONFIDENCE IN DEPENDABILITY CLAIMS?
We mentioned earlier that the use of multiple argument legs arises informally from reasoning similar to that used to justify the use of diverse channel redundancy to obtain system reliability. Questions that are of interest for systems have similar counterparts here. How much of a confidence gain do we obtain via the above two-legged argument model over the verification-only argument model or the testing-only argument model? Equation (18) 12. An interesting figure to use for the number of test cases in (8) is n ¼ 4;602. This is the number of tests required to give a Bayesian 99 percent upper confidence bound, on the pfd S, that is less than 10 À3 when no failures are observed, under the simple model assumptions used in [21] . In terms of our model here, those assumptions say essentially that there is no verification leg, that the oracle is known to behave perfectly, and that the prior distribution of Z and the conditional distribution P ðSjZÞ are such that S is initially uniformly distributed on the unit interval.
13. That is, assuming s 6 ¼ 0; 1.
understanding of the "shape" of this functional dependence? What are the important drivers of the benefit coming from the use of multiple legs? For example, does correlation between doubts in the assumptions play an important role, as intuition would suggest? How does the two-legged argument doubt (18) compare with its "naive independence" version in which, for a fixed claim, the doubts emanating from the two single argument legs are simply multiplied to produce the supposed two-leg-argument doubt?
Benefit of the Two-Legged Argument and Its Dependence on Stochastic Association between Doubts in Assumptions for Each Leg
We show next that it is possible to assign the parameters of our two-legged model such that we leave only one value possible, either of V or of T , respectively, or of each of V and T . This single value is, in each case, the "ideal observation" value V ¼ verified or T ¼ no failures. Thus, we can choose parameters that make, in (2) and the equations following, P ðV ¼ verified j SZÞ or P ðT ¼ no failures j OSÞ, respectively, become a constant, 1 (so, no longer depending on the values of SZO). Note that this procedure of altering the model's local conditional probability tables until only one value of a variable (of V or of T , here) has positive probability is mathematically distinct from summation over that variable (with tables such that two or more of its values have positive probability). It is easy to verify in the case of our model that the first procedure does in fact produce a factorization of the joint distribution that-at least in the cases of "ideal observations"-is identical to that which would arise from one or the other of our proposed single argument topologies (see Figs. 2 and 3 ). More precisely stated, although it is possible to derive, for each of the two single-legged arguments in Figs. 2 and 3 , a parametric representation of the "doubt" (18) , just as we have done above for the two-legged argument, is actually simpler and, in fact, equivalent (in the case where we condition on ideal observations) to directly deduce the analogous consequences of the singleleg arguments in Figs. 2 and 3 as special cases of the results for the combined argument obtained by the following special parametric assignments. Our removal of testing evidence from the argument is equivalent to substituting n ¼ 0 in (18) to produce a doubt:
for the verification-only argument. (Unsurprisingly, the initial beliefs about the likely oracle correctness are not present in this expression.) Similarly, for the testing-only argument, we can substitute ð; Þ ¼ ð0; 1Þ in (18) to produce
for our ideal observations case of the single testing-argument leg. To see this, 14 consider the third row (of five rows) in the body in Table 1 . The above substitutions make all entries in this row equal. That is to say, the substitutions make P ðV ¼ verified j ZSÞ independent of the values of both Z and S in just the manner we described at the beginning of this section. (Consider the effect on (3) and (5) .) It is not difficult to confirm from our algebraic conclusions that the effect of this is equivalent to the removal of node V from the model, that is, the conversion of Fig. 1 to Fig. 2 , as required.
We now compare some plots of the three doubt functions ((18), (22) , and (23)), for fixed s ¼ 10 À3 , as we vary certain other model parameters. The plots in Fig. 4 show the value of log 10 of the doubt function (18) and were produced by setting the threshold s value to 10 À3 and the model parameters 
The nine plots shown may be thought of as three groups of three. These groups were produced by setting ðn; ; Þ in turn to the values (4,602, 0.1, 0.1), then (4,602, 0, 1), then (0, 0.1, 0.1). The first of these three vectors represents a twolegged argument, which may be compared against the second two, which are special cases (23) and (22) of (18), corresponding, respectively, to testing-only and verificationonly single-legged arguments, with the other parameters (24) common to all three groups.
Within each group of three, the individual plots are distinguished and the variation of each along the horizontal axis is determined by manipulating the -matrix as follows.
was reparameterized in terms of the triple ð cÃ ; Ãc ; cvÞ. The first two of these three parameters are the prior marginal probabilities of correctness for the specification Z and the oracle O. Variation of these is what separates the three different plots within each group. The third parameter cv, used as the horizontal axis, is an analog of the covariance between Z and O (not strictly a covariance in the usual sense since the state spaces of these two variables are not numeric but equal to the covariance if they were converted to a pair of Bernoulli random variables):
Thus, each individual plot considered alone represents the effect on the value of the doubt function of an increasing positive prior covariance cv between the correctness of specification and of oracle, while keeping the prior marginal correctness probabilities of both Z and O fixed. Comparison between the nine plots illustrates both the effect of changing marginal correctness probabilities cÃ and Ãc , as well as the comparison of the two single-legged arguments against each other and against the two-legged argument. It perhaps helps to disentangle the plots in Fig. 4 to state the following descriptive observations about the shapes of the nine curves. We will refer to individual curves here by numbering them 1 . . . in plots (7, 8, 9) . For each fixed value of the prior marginals, toward the left-hand end (small cv) of the graph, 15 there is a clear ordering in the "performance" (for these particular chosen model parameter values) between the three arguments: The two-legged argument (2, 5, 8) , is better than the testing-only argument (1, 4, 7) , which is better than the verification-only argument (3, 6, 9) . However, the ordering of the twolegged argument as compared to the testing-only argument is reversed toward the right-hand end of the graph. (See further discussion below.) . There are six plotted doubt functions that are not flat. Of these, three (2, 5, 8) are from the two-legged argument and three (1, 4, 7) are from the testing-only argument. For each cÃ and Ãc , the two-legged argument doubt function has a steeper gradient-as a function of the correlation cv-than the corresponding testing-only argument. (2 is steeper than 1, and so forth.) The latter does increase as a function of cv, but, in each case, rather more gently than it would with the addition of verification evidence. . 
19).
Notice that the two-legged argument gives the greatest confidence in each case. In comparing the two-legged argument with the testingonly single-legged argument, one notable observation is that, as the correlation cv between specification and oracle correctness becomes very (perhaps implausibly?) high toward the right-hand sides of the plots, we seem to arrive at a situation in which the fact of being informed that the system has been successfully verified against its specification slightly undermines the high confidence that had been obtained from the failure-free testing alone. This is the first of several, at first sight, counterintuitive model behaviors that we shall meet. We see below that our current model topology, with its uncertainties concerning a potentially defective oracle or specification and use of conservative assumptions, allows some complex kinds of model behavior, which may either be realistic features of rational uncertainty or only spurious model artifacts. In the latter case, their exclusion may require parameter constraints on the node probability distributions with which, it will perhaps eventually be possible to argue, all competent expert beliefs will necessarily conform. (24) and the following text.
15. However, we continue, as before, to refer to the plots by number, according to their order at the right-hand end.
The examples above all involve a symmetric -matrix, so that Z and O have equal marginal probabilities of being correct. Of course, we have no reason to suppose this is representative of real beliefs for this kind of system. We experimented with various other parameter values and obtained a varied set of conclusions as to the comparative efficacy of the two-legged and single-legged arguments based on this model. To examine one more numerical example, which has a slightly higher prior "covariance" cv ¼ 0:075 between Z and O correctness but coupled with some rather more optimistic values of other parameters and a greater prior confidence in specification correctness than in oracle correctness, put 
and retain the same values as above for the amount of testing n ¼ 4;602 and the claim S s ¼ 10 À3 . Using these values produces approximately equal confidence in the claim from each single leg and almost a two-thirds reduction in doubt when we use our model to combine the evidence from these two separate legs. The doubt function values P ðS > 10 À3 j ideal obs:Þ, in the order (verification leg, testing leg, two legged), are (0.12, 0.12, 0.045). Therefore, as might be expected, a two-legged argument can bring considerable increase in confidence about a claim, in comparison with each of its constituent legs. Whether this occurs in practice will, of course, depend upon the details of the expert beliefs as represented by the model parameters.
Doubt as a Function of the Number n of Test Cases
Under "ideal observations" (no detected failure), one might expect, as with earlier models [21] , that S should stochastically decrease-in terms of its posterior distribution (18) or (23) in the testing-only case-monotonically as the quantity n of positive testing evidence accumulates. Increasing confidence from continued failure-free testing surely ought to make this posterior probability decrease monotonically in n for every fixed s. We will not attempt to solve for the general parametric assumptions required such that our two-legged argument, with testing evidence incorporated, should provide higher confidence than the single verification-only leg (the n ¼ 0 case (22) of (18)). We only note that, for "very large" n, this is so whenever (22) exceeds (18) with 0 substituted for and 0 . This is because of the limiting property of the beta moments noted in Section 5 (recalling that the incomplete beta terms in (18) are bounded by 1 as n ! 1). This is the case in all of the example plots in Fig. 5 . These show the value of log 10 of the doubt function (18) plotted against the number n of test cases, using a claim s ¼ 10 À3 and model parameters 
The plots differ from each other only in the values of the matrix, which were produced by fixing the marginal probabilities of specification/oracle correctness at cÃ ¼ Ãc ¼ 0:8. The correlation coefficient between Z-correctness and O-correctness varies as we read down the key on the right-hand side, with an unbelievable exact equality in the top plot (specification is correct precisely and only when the oracle is correct; otherwise, both are incorrect), working down to an almost equally unbelievable negative correlation at the bottom. The second-to-the-bottom plot represents independence ðcv ¼ 0Þ between the correctness of the oracle and of the specification. Clearly, the general pattern here is again that low (or even negative) correlation of the prior beliefs in specification and oracle correctness yields an advantage in terms of confidence levels derivable from the two-legged argument, confirming our observation of the same tendency in Fig. 4 above. Notice that there appears to be a very slight deterioration in the confidence at large n values; that is, there is a turning point at some n-value (which varies from one plot to another) occurring before the limiting n ! 1 value is approached. We give some explanation of this quirk in Section 7 and of other model characteristics that might appear counterintuitive on first inspection.
7 SOME COUNTERINTUITIVE RESULTS
Supportive and Nonsupportive Single Argument Legs
As we have seen in Section 6, the acquisition of evidence that is "obviously good news"-what we have called ideal evidence-can sometimes result in a reduction in confidence.
In this section, we shall examine, in some detail, examples of such apparently nonintuitive results. Our approach is to use some numerical search and optimization tools to investigate the question of whether or not, under the present model, the arrival of ideal "supportive" evidence results in increased confidence in the pfd. We begin with a single argument. At first sight, it might appear self-evident what "supportive evidence" should look like: For a verification leg, the evidence is supportive precisely if the system is verified correct. For a testing leg (though there may also be a gray area), it seems clear at first sight that no failures or very few failures among a large number of test cases is supportive evidence. In contrast, a system's failure to be verified correct or to succeed sufficiently often during test should reduce our confidence.
In fact, we can show that this is not always the case. The prior confidence in the claim here is 0.99583, but the posterior confidence, in spite of the extensive "good news" from testing, is decreased to 0.66803. At first glance, such a result is quite surprising and counterintuitive. On closer inspection, however, we believe that there is an intuitive explanation in terms of two "rival explanations" for a long period of failure-free testing. Reasoning informally, guided by the property of adjacency in the topology of Fig. 2 , we see that, on one hand, extensive failure-free testing, applied as evidence to node T , may be taken to indicate a low system pfd S. Realistic node conditional probabilities for T will surely capture this effect. However, symmetrically, on the left-hand side of Fig. 2 , a parallel negative inference of a potentially low oracle quality O also suggests itself as a rival explanation of the apparently positive testing evidence: Perhaps a defective oracle is missing failures. These two inferences from T may both follow when n becomes very large without failure. One can imagine a tension arising at node S between these two competing tendencies of the testing evidence. This raises the questions of how the two inferences interact and whether one "dominates" in its effect upon posterior beliefs about S. The answer will depend partly on the conditional probability distribution P ðT jOSÞ. (Note that-although in no sense essential to this explanation-the "conservative" assumption (9) would appear to increase the viability of the second potential explanation for apparently successful testing.) However, our model in Fig. 2 also contains a prior belief structure "higher up," usually with stochastic association of some kind between the variables ZOS. The combined effect of the two available inferences from observing large n without failure will also depend on this "upper part" of the topology. In particular, does this structure of prior belief contain a positive prior probabilistic association between the correctness of the oracle O and the quality of the system (small value for S)-perhaps via a shared association with the correctness of Z? If the answer to this question is "yes," then it seems plausible that, for certain model parameter values, evidence of a defective oracle could have the effect of reducing confidence in a low system pfd. For example, in the last numerical example, the increased doubt in the correctness of the oracle (sum of terms in the last column of matrices above) is associated with an increased doubt about the correctness of the specification (sum of the terms of the last row of the matrices). Thus, when we see very many failure-free test cases, we may increase our mistrust in the oracle, increase our mistrust in the specification, and thus increase our mistrust in the pfd-see constraint (10) . We stress that this informal conception of competing effects at S of successful testing is not intrinsic to the topology of Fig. 2 but relies heavily on node conditional probability assumptions. The model topology is sufficiently flexible to allow such possibilities, but whether or not they are found will also depend also on the 2 Â 2 prior matrix for ZO, the parameter values used for our two point-mass-augmented beta distributions (12) for P ðS j ZÞ and on the conditional probabilities (8) and (9) comprising P ðT j OSÞ.
Examples of nonsupportive verification arguments may also be obtained. gives a decrease from a high prior confidence 0.99972 to a much lower 0.77064 after the positive verification. We suggest that although this, perhaps counterintuitive, behavior may well have been accentuated by our conservative assumption (7) (for the verification outcome in the case that the specification Z ¼ incorrect), it would still be possible after a degree of relaxation of this conservative assumption, given the "right" conditional probabilities applied to our topology. In more detail, our tentative explanation for this effect is given as follows: Although ignorant of the true value of S, the observation of a successful verification at V provides, under our conservative assumption, stronger support for the incorrectness than for the correctness of the specification Z. Specifically, beliefs about the unobservable variable Z become changed (by the news of the successful system verification) from the prior probability 0.9997156 of Z's correctness to P ðZ ¼ correct j V Þ ¼ 0:77060. This opens a chain of subsequent inference of the following kind. The prior stochastic association between correct Z and small S required in (10) gives this increased Z-doubt a tendency to increase the probability of large S.
In the case of the numbers used above, we can perhaps best illustrate this by dividing the range of S into two bins ½0; 10 À3 and ð10 À3 ; 1Þ. Using the same 2 Â 2 matrix layout that we have used above for joint beliefs about ZO, we can compute the prior beliefs which illustrates how the doubt cast on Z by the successful verification has caused belief to "shift along the main diagonal" from ðZ ¼ correct; S 10 À3 Þ to ðZ ¼ incorrect; S > 10 À3 Þ: We do not assert that the chains of inference shown in these examples will be realistic in every model application. Much will depend on the parameter values assigned to the node conditional probabilities and on how, for example, these stochastically associate the variables Z, O, and S. We might well later choose to replace the assumptions we have called "conservative" by alternatives that we might elicit as real experts' beliefs, about the likely effects of defective oracles and specifications. However, our examples of quite subtle interactions between evidence, assumptions, and assumption doubt do illustrate the richness of the kinds of competing inferences modeled within even a highly simplified BBN structure and alert us to the fact that symbolic analysis may identify model consequences that initially will seem surprising and counterintuitive.
Adding a Supportive Leg May Not Improve Confidence
Having made these observations that the effects of "ideal" evidence are not always of the kind one might naively expect, we now focus on improvement in confidence as our stricter definition of a "supportive argument" (as opposed to mere "ideal evidence": V ¼ verified and/or T ¼ no failures). Thus, we will call an argument supportive if it improves upon the prior confidence. Therefore, the testing leg with outcome T is called "supportive" whenever P ðS sjT Þ > PðS sÞ. Similarly, a verification leg with an outcome V is called "supportive" whenever P ðS sjV Þ > PðS sÞ. The duallegged argument is "supportive" when P ðS sjV T Þ > P ðS sÞ:
For each set of model parameters, there are actually four different cases for which one can ask whether a confidence improvement occurs on the receipt of ideal evidence from an argument leg. A system assessor may obtain either testing-leg evidence, T ¼ no failures, or formal verificationleg evidence, V ¼ verified, in each case, with or without evidence of the other kind being already present. We explained in Section 6.1 that, as our model stands, all these four questions may be framed mathematically as the questions as to whether a single expression, which can be either of (18) or (20), increases or decreases when ideal evidence is received. In terms of this expression, ideal testing evidence is added by changing from n ¼ 0 to a general nonzero n value (and making the associated change to and 0 , from 1 to the corresponding values). Similarly, ideal verification evidence is added by changing from ð; Þ ¼ ð0; 1Þ to the general pair.
Thinking of the values of our doubt expression (18) as laid out as a square with each side corresponding to the receipt of "ideal evidence" V or T , we can depict the conditions described in the questions above diagrammatically. In our diagrams, a downward arrow corresponds to the receipt of ideal testing-leg evidence and a rightward arrow corresponds to the receipt of ideal verification-leg evidence. Therefore, the top-left vertex corresponds to prior confidence and the bottom-right vertex to the final confidence after the evidence from both legs is in. Following an arrow represents "progress," in the sense that further ideal evidence is received. The "> " (beside a right-pointing arrow) and "_" (beside a downward-pointing arrow) symbols are used to indicate a decrease in confidence as we move along the arrow. Thus, the counterintuitive situations that we have called nonsupportive single legs look like
for verification-leg evidence and like
for testing evidence. In these diagrams, a zero represents the absence of evidence for one or the other leg.
We are now in a position to ask whether counterintuitive results are possible within our model for two-legged arguments. It is worth recalling here the systems metaphor that underpins the intuition behind the use of such arguments. It is well known that the reliability of a oneout-of-two system will always be greater than or equal to the reliability of the best of the two components. Is this true of our two-legged arguments; in particular, is it always the case that confidence will increase if we add a second supportive argument leg to an initial supportive leg? That is, can either of the following two cases occur:
We have examined this question numerically and tentatively conclude that, for our current model, the answers are no, the scenario depicted in (30) is ruled out; and yes, it is possible for the case of (29) to occur in which a supportive verification leg can depress confidence when it is added to preexisting ideal testing evidence, which itself is supportive when considered alone.
For a numerical example of this case (29) With these parameters, the prior confidence 0.8001 is considerably improved, to 0.9659, by a positive system verification outcome. Without any such verification leg, but with, instead, ideal testing evidence from the 10,006 trials, the confidence improves to as much as 0.999627. However, when the positive verification evidence is added as one of the two legs to this ideal testing outcome, much of this large confidence gain from the testing leg alone is lost, with a confidence now of only 0.9671, which-although still an improvement over the prior confidence-is not as great an improvement as was obtained from the testing leg alone. That is, the act of adding a supportive verification leg to a testing leg has actually lowered our confidence in the claim. When comparing the confidence resulting from a twolegged argument against the prior confidence and against that from each single leg individually, we can lay out these four confidence values in a 2 Â 2 format: 
matching the layout of our square diagrams above. We have used curved brackets around the matrix to distinguish it visually from our other frequently used 2 Â 2-matrix notation for joint distributions of variables ZO (for which we will reserve a square-bracketed matrix notation). Using the same layout as that in (27), (28), (29), and (30)-with the prior beliefs as the top-left-hand square-bracketed matrix, and the beliefs emanating from a two-legged argument at the bottom right, and so forth-the four possible sets of beliefs about the ZO pair for this example, under the four possible conditions of evidence discussed, appear as P ðZO j obs:Þ ¼ P ðZO P ðZO j V Þ P ðZO j T Þ P ðZO j V TÞ 
Some further insight into the apparently counterintuitive result-that adding a supportive verification leg to the testing leg can reduce confidence in the dependability claim-comes from examining these intermediate numerical results. Consider first the prior belief represented by the top-left matrix in (32); in particular, note that the leading diagonal of this matrix suggests that the a priori beliefs about Z and O are positively associated. That is, the belief that the specification is incorrect results in a stronger belief that the oracle is incorrect and vice versa. The verification leg is supportive when we have no testing evidence (that is, it increases confidence from its a priori value). However, the above reasoning shows that the presence of (successful) testing can undermine the contribution that the verification leg makes to the overall confidence in the dependability claim when both argument legs are present. In fact, this undermining can be so severe that adding the verification leg makes things worse compared with having only the testing leg.
Examination of the parameter values used to construct this example might cause one to conclude that some of them seem unlikely to be realistic beliefs of experts about real systems. For example, consider the virtual prior certainty, according to these parameters, that the specification is correct, or the asymptotes (b; b 0 < 1) of the two beta distributions at the 1 end of the unit interval [0, 1]. It remains to determine whether actual realistic beliefs could also exhibit property (29).
Numerically, we have been unable to obtain a similar example with T and V interchanged, that is, satisfying (30). We conjecture that such an example may prove to be analytically impossible for our current model, so long as we impose our stochastic ordering constraint (10 With these values, the ideal evidence produces three confidence levels, laid out next to the prior confidence as in the last example: 
Here, the supportive testing evidence produces an improvement of the two-legged over the verification-only argument, which is less than one in the fourth significant decimal digit.
SPECIAL CASE OF CLAIMS FOR PERFECTION, S ¼ 0
If, instead of a claimed upper bound S s on pfd, we make a claim for perfection, that is, S ¼ 0, then we obtain a special case of the above expressions for confidence and doubt for which certain of the counterintuitive results demonstrated above become no longer possible. This substitution corresponds to the special case where our confidence refers to a claim that the system is perfectly reliable, rather than merely that its pfd does not exceed some positive threshold value S s > 0. First, we can show that, for such a perfection claim, operation that is completely failure free throughout testing always constitutes a supportive argument leg in the sense that we identified in Section 7.1, for the simple reason that our model assumptions clearly make S ¼ 0 and S ¼ 0&T identical events. Thus, we must have a confidence from the testing leg only given by
that is not less than the prior confidence. Further, for this perfection claim, we can easily prove the special case of the result that, for a more general claim, we have so far been able to verify only numerically without an analytic proof: Ideal testing evidence added to a positive verification outcome to produce a two-legged argument always 16 improves upon the confidence emanating from the verification leg alone. Essentially, the same short proof as that given above works again here. Our model assumptions make S ¼ 0&V and S ¼ 0&V T identical events. Therefore, we have a final confidence P ðS ¼ 0jV T Þ in this perfection claim from the two-legged argument which exceeds the confidence P ðS ¼ 0jV Þ emanating from the single-leg verification argument because
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
As we have said earlier in this paper, the BBN that we have studied here has been an oversimplified one. The first simplification is in only taking account of statistical testing and proof evidence: We have ignored other kinds of evidence that would clearly be relevant in practice-for example, evidence concerning the quality and competence of the personnel involved at all stages. Furthermore, each of the argument legs considered here is itself unrealistically simplified: For example, the testing leg ignores important issues concerning the accuracy of the operational profile.
We have also artificially reduced some of the state spaces to Boolean. Finally, to make the mathematics tractable, we have had to introduce some simplifying assumptions that (rather tentatively) we claim to be "conservative." Our main reason for these simplifications lay in our desire to carry out the analysis completely analytically. We wanted to obtain complete analytic expressions for posterior distributions in terms of parametric families of input node probability distributions. This contrasts with the more common approach to BBN analysis in which numerical expressions-for example, involving elicited expert beliefs -are manipulated using tools like Hugin [22] . Simply populating the node probability tables in this way results only in a single numerical posterior distribution for the goal variable S.
Our intention here was to obtain greater insight into the factors that determine the efficacy of arguments and, in particular, of multilegged arguments. We started from the position that efficacy would be judged by the confidence that the arguments engendered in dependability claims. We wanted a better understanding of how confidence is determined by factors such as the doubt in the truth of assumptions underpinning the arguments. In particular, we sought to understand the importance of association-for example, between the doubts about the assumptions for different argument legs-in determining the effectiveness of the multilegged argument approach.
In spite of the great simplification we have applied, the model turns out to be quite complex and difficult to understand. We were somewhat surprised by this and we regard it as a strong warning against a naive trust in the results of a conventional numerical analysis of a BBN like this. In particular, we believe that the analytic approach has exposed some nonintuitive and surprising results that would not be noticed in a conventional numerical analysis. It would be possible to be lulled into a false sense of certainty and security and believe the numerical consequences that one would not believe with the benefit of greater insight (for example, offered by the kind of analysis that we have conducted).
These remarks confirm our long-held view that BBNs need to be treated with great respect and humility [23] , [24] . The Bayesian approach is clearly the right one for the representation of uncertainty and the BBN formalism has immeasurably aided understanding and construction of complex probability models. However, the very seductiveness of the approach-particularly, in its automated numerical form-can bring unwarranted confidence in the results.
When we set out on this work, we had in mind an analogy with the use of diversity in systems-multiple diverse channels-to increase reliability and safety. It seemed plausible that multilegged arguments could be used similarly to increase confidence in claims about dependability (for example, safety). It turns out that this analogy breaks down in surprising ways.
One way in which the systems metaphor breaks down concerns composability of arguments. Our example illustrates that it can be straightforward to decompose a model for a two-legged argument, producing two derived single-leg models as special cases corresponding to a degenerate observation for one or another argument leg. However, there is no standard reverse operation of composition starting from a given pair of single-leg models. The representation of dependence via variables that link the two argument legs is an additional and difficult modeling task, whose solution is integral to any meaningful model of a two-legged argument.
Another surprising way in which the systems/arguments analogy breaks down concerns efficacy; whereas it is easy to show that, for systems, a diverse one-out-of-two system is always more reliable than each of its component channels, the same is not true of arguments. We cannot be sure that the confidence in a dependability claim arising from a diverse two-legged ("one-out-of-two") argument is greater than that arising from either of the single argument legs. Indeed, we have examples where a single leg is to be preferred to the same leg aided by a further supportive argument leg; that is, additional "good news" is not necessarily beneficial and can even be detrimental.
Such results are, at first glance, counterintuitive; indeed, if they had been obtained from a purely numerical analysis, they would be hard to explain. The more detailed analysis here has the advantage of showing how this kind of thing can happen by revealing the subtle interplay between assumptions and evidence, both within and between legs. It thus provides warnings against drawing simplistic-albeit intuitively plausible-conclusions. It cannot be too strongly emphasized that it is only through completely analytical treatment-difficult though it is-that we get these insights.
On the other hand, it is clear that in many cases-as might be expected-multilegged arguments do bring benefits in terms of increased confidence in dependability claims compared with single arguments, as we have shown in Section 6. From a practical point of view, we would like to know exactly when such benefits can be expected and how extensive they might be. Ideally, we would like to be able to design multilegged arguments-before the expensive process of evidence collection begins-so that confidence in a dependability claim will be gained most costeffectively.
We do not claim that our work here enables this to be done. However, we do believe that it is a useful beginning in understanding some of the key issues. Thus, for example, in Section 6, we show how it is possible with our analytical treatment of the BBN to perform "what if" calculations on the effect of dependence, in assumption doubts for the two legs, upon the confidence that the two-legged argument provides in the claim. It is easy to see how this kind of study could be used to compare different possible multilegged arguments before committing to the expense of deploying them in a particular dependability case.
Concerning the general efficacy of diverse arguments in real-life applications, it is clear that more work is needed. It would be interesting to know, for example, whether the kinds of parameters that are realistic (for example, for experts' beliefs) in our simplified model result in twolegged arguments that are almost always effective (in the sense of being better than the constituent legs). Are the exceptions that we have identified in some sense "not believable" when real experts assess real systems? To what extent are some of these results the consequence of our need to make "conservative" assumptions for mathematical tractability? The results presented here are largely neutral on such issues: They concern what might happen rather than what will happen when real experts assess real systems. It is worth stating, however, that, when we constructed the simplified example used in the paper, we did not anticipate those consequences that we have called "counterintuitive": It seems possible, even after considerable reflection, to be surprised by what is implied by a complex model. This is likely to be true a fortiori for more realistic and, thus, more complex models.
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